Fiqh occupies a central position in the Muslim intellectual tradition as a comprehensive scholarly discipline that developed through the interaction of revelatory texts, human reasoning, and changing social and civilizational realities. Across different historical, geographical, and intellectual contexts, this tradition gave rise to diverse juristic schools. While certain principled disagreements remained within the framework of a single legal school without disrupting its unity, other disagreements eventually resulted in the emergence of independent schools of law. This historical phenomenon raises an important scholarly question concerning the nature and limits of principled disagreement: under what circumstances can such disagreement be accommodated within a single juristic tradition, and when does it justify the establishment of a distinct legal school? This question constitutes the central focus of the present study. The paper argues that not every disagreement concerning legal principles necessarily undermines the unity of a juristic school. Rather, the decisive issue lies in identifying the criteria that distinguish internal diversity from independent juristic identity. To examine this hypothesis, the study employs an analytical and comparative methodology, investigating principled disagreements within the broader historical and theoretical framework of the formation, continuity, and diversification of Islamic legal schools.